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Abstract
Because much of work incentives are provided through promotions, their effec-
tiveness depends to a large extent on the structure of the organization’s hierarchy.
Here we investigate the impact of the incentive motive on the optimal hierarchy
using the Auriol-Renault (2000) framework which highlights the role of recognition
in the work place. This framework provides a rationale for using promotions as an
incentive device which relies on a complementarity between recognition and income:
those who earn more should also earn more recognition. We identify factors which
affect the hierarchy in terms of number of ranks, population size at each rank and
the extent of the differentiation between ranks. We show that the harder it is for an
employee to improve performance through effort the more pyramid-like is the hier-
archy, with a small group of successful individuals at the top earning high income
and recognition. If a high performance may be easily achieved, a seniority based
promotion system may be optimal.
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1 Introduction
Labor earnings represent roughly two thirds of the developed economies total national
income. These economies rely to a large extent on their human-resources. The manage-
ment of these ”resources” is one of the most important task of formal organizations such
as firms, administrations or teaching institutions. The ability to choose the right people,
to favor the development of their knowledge and skills, to create incentives for them to
work, is at the heart of success in organizations. Organizations make an extensive use
of promotions as a means of providing incentive to their members. A promotion system
is a system where individuals are ranked in a hierarchy and paid according to their rank
(monetary rewards are attached to positions). Positions are revised regularly so that high
past performances are rewarded by a promotion (the successful agent is moved upward in
the hierarchy, thus benefiting in general from an increase both in his rank and income).
This paper uses the framework of Auriol-Renault (2000) to study the design of optimal
hierarchical structures as part of a promotion system.
To understand the use of promotions for incentive purposes it is necessary to take
into account the potentially long term relationship involved in a labor contract.1 Then,
the appropriate theoretical framework is that of repeated moral hazard. An important
result in this literature is that the optimal long term incentive contract should involve
some memory: the types of incentives which are currently given to an agent depend
on her past performance (see for instance Rogerson (1985) and Chiapori et al. (1992)).
The idea is that, if agents are risk averse, it is optimal to spread over time the effect of
income shocks resulting from good or bad performances; this is the need for consumption
smoothing emphasized by Malcomson and Spinnewyn (1988). Then the agent’s wage in a
given period should not vary too much as a function of his current performance. Rather,
current performance should affect the way the agent will be treated in future periods.
A typical car insurance contract, where the history of each driver influences the amount
1”In the early 1980s the typical U.S. worker was in a job that would last about eight years, with a
quarter of the work force being in jobs that will last 20 years or more.” (Milgrom-Robert (1992) page
358).
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currently paid, is an example of such long term incentive contracts.
Although a promotion system may be a way to implement an intertemporal incentive
scheme it is presumably not the only one, and more importantly, not the most efficient.
Indeed in a promotion system the benefits of work tend to be delayed to later stages of
the career, and awarded only to a lucky few. An extreme example of this is provided by
”up or out” policies such as tenure track contracts. Since the insurance motive calls on
the contrary for consumption smoothing, promotions are very difficult to explain in the
classical principal-agent framework. One explanation for the use of such discrete incentive
schemes is that it is not always possible to assess absolute performances whereas relative
performances are easier to establish. Then following Lazear-Rosen (1981), a promotion
may be seen as a prize in a tournament between employees. However ”While agency
theory suggests that relative performance should be used in situations where there is
common risk, it is only in very special cases that the optimal means of compensation
involves only relative performance evaluation (Mookherjee 1984), as occurs in tourna-
ments.” (Prendergast 1999). In practice organizations collect information on the absolute
performance of their workers, and use it in their promotion policies. Moreover, in many
instances promotions are based on seniority. Then promotion cannot be assimilated to a
tournament.2
Auriol-Renault (2000) show that to better understand promotion policies, it is useful to
acknowledge the social motive to individual action, namely that economic agents care both
about private –monetary– and social –social status– retributions.3 If social recognition
matters for individuals’ performances, the organization will try to manipulate it. An
important result in Auriol-Renault (2000) is that such a manipulation is costly. In a short
term relationship (i.e., in a static context) introducing symbolic differentiation among
2Freeman-Medoff (1984) ”Note that among nonunion firms, almost 42 percent lay off solely on the
basis of seniority consideration, while a mere 14 percent ignore seniority, only considering profitability
considerations.” (Prendergast 1999)
3Individuals care about social rewards in so far as they affect their behavior as well as the behavior of
others towards them. An explanation, in addition to the obvious one that a human being is social, can be
found in Fershtman and Weiss (1996) who characterize the circumstances under which evolution leads to
the survival of socially minded individuals even though relative fitness is determined by economic payoffs
only.
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identical workers is harmful to the organization. Indeed social status being relative in
essence, providing a priori some individuals with a higher social status is done at the
expanse of status degradation for others. This is reinforced by the fact that, in equilibrium,
social status and monetary rewards being complement, individuals with higher status
also earn higher monetary rewards. As individual marginal performance is decreasing in
aggregate rewards, the benefit on the high status/income workers is not compensating for
the loss on the low status/income ones.
Once dynamic considerations come into play Auriol-Renault (2000) show that it is
optimal for the organization to introduce differentiation among organization members.
While young the undifferentiated workers work hard for minimal status and wage in
the hope of obtaining a promotion in case of success. In case of failure, they get a
lower position with lower reward. Though it distorts the profit on senior workers, the
differentiation between previously successful and unsuccessful agents is optimal; it lowers
the total wage bill. This result emerges because the elasticity of substitution between
social and monetary rewards is positive. Then the least costly way of achieving a certain
level of expected utility (for given effort levels) is to concentrate both resources in a
particular state of nature. For incentive purposes they are concentrated in the later part
of the working life, and awarded to previously successful agents. This result which holds
when agents are risk-neutral with respect to income, is robust to the introduction of
risk-aversion.
Regarding promotion policies, practitioners put much emphasis on issues such as the
number of distinct hierarchies (e.g., a different one for executives, clerical staff, or“ blue
collar workers”), the number of levels in each (number of rank, salary grades), pay differ-
entials between ranks (15% is the rule of thumb), time it takes an employee to progress
through the hierarchy: ”Managers and union officials devote considerable resources to
developing and administering pay structure and behave as if the number of distinct struc-
tures, number of levels, size of the differentials, and rate of progress matter.” (Gerhart-
Milkovich 1991) Yet theoretical attempts at analyzing hierarchies remain surprisingly
sparse, and systematic data are rarely reported in the literature. In particular the liter-
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ature on repeated moral hazard derives optimal contracts that specify an intertemporal
structure for monetary incentives. It says nothing about agents taking different positions
in a hierarchy with pay attached to jobs. While in Auriol-Renault (2000) we clearly estab-
lish that it is optimal to provide incentives through promotions, we offer limited insight
as to what should be the associated hierarchical and pay structure. This paper builds
on our results in a dynamic framework to analyze hierarchies as an incentive device in a
promotion system. Considered as a pure human resource management variable, they are
referred to as ”Incentive Hierarchies” to distinguish them from the technical hierarchies
in Radner (1993), Bolton-Dewatripont (1994) and Visser (2001).4
The hierarchical structure is a key feature of any organization. In particular it es-
tablishes a clear order among organization members who are ranked from top to bottom
according to the transitive relation ”superior to”. Assuming people care about social
rewards, this ranking directly affects their preferences. Under the assumption that agents
with a higher ”rank” are more responsive to monetary incentives,5 we derive the optimal
hierarchical structure associated with a promotion system. We investigate what should
be the number of ranks, the population size at each rank and the extent of the differen-
tiation between ranks in an optimal incentive hierarchy. To the best of our knowledge,
this problem has not yet been addressed in the economic literature. We specify parame-
terized functional forms for tastes and technology. We introduce a parameter measuring
an agent’s ability and/or willingness to improve his performance through effort. We show
that there may be two types of hierarchies which we label ”Seniority Hierarchies” and
”Merit Hierarchies” respectively. ”Seniority Hierarchies” are optimal when an agent’s
willingness/ability to improve his performance is high enough so that it is optimal to
induce him to exert an effort level that guarantees a high performance. Because all young
workers perform well, they are all promoted. There are only two ranks in the hierarchy
and an agent’s rank is solely determined by his seniority. When a high performance is
not so easily achieved, then promotions are based on merit as well as seniority. More
4These authors focus on the impact of the hierarchical structure on an organization’s ability to process
information and to minimize reaction lags. It is modeled as a grid to channel information flows. Their
analysis highlights the technical aspect of hierarchies.
5For a discussion of this assumption see Auriol-Renault (2000).
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specifically, the ”Merit Hierarchy” has three ranks with the young at the bottom, the old
who were unsuccessful when young in the middle and the old who were successful when
young at the top. As the willingness/ability to improve performance decreases, the top
group becomes smaller and is granted a very high status along with a high wage while
the middle group is comprised of most of the old population.
Section 2 sets up an overlapping generations model of the workplace. Section 3 studies
the optimal steady state hierarchy and pay structure in a dynamic problem within an
infinitely lived organization. Our findings are summarized in Section 4.
2 The model
We consider an overlapping generations model with infinite horizon based on Auriol-
Renault (2000). A risk-neutral principal wants to maximize the ”profit” of the unit
(bureau, subdivision, firm,...) she supervises. At each date, the organization is comprised
of two ”generations”: the ”young” (the junior) who enter the organization in the current
period and the ”old” (the senior) who joined the organization in the previous period and
will not be around in the next one. Hence each cohort only lives two periods. It is assumed
that the population of agents is large so that it may be represented by a continuum. It is
composed at each period of an equal number of young and old normalized without loss of
generality to 1. It has thus a constant population of agents of 2. The principal’s objective
function, which is assumed to be intertemporally separable with a discount factor δ ≤ 1,
is strictly increasing in total output and strictly decreasing in the total wage bill. The
marginal rate of substitution between the two is assumed to be constant and may thus
be normalized to 1 without loss of generality. Such preferences are represented by:
+∞∑
t=0
δtpit =
+∞∑
t=0
δt
(
Qt −Wt
)
.(1)
where Qt is total output and Wt is the wage bill in period t. This specification is consistent
with the objectives of a profit maximizing firm.
6
2.1 Workers
In order to focus on the incentive implications of the choice of an optimal hierarchical
structure, workers are assumed to be ex ante identical individuals, hired to do the same
type of work. That is, there is no a priori legitimate hierarchy among them, and, since
they are intended to do the same work, there is no need for one. To be more specific each
worker living at date t, either junior or senior, contributes to the collective outcome by
exerting an effort eit ≥ 0. The harder agent i works (the higher eit is), the larger is the
probability of a high output for the unit. Individual i working at date t contributes to
the total output for an amount qit which may be either high q
i
t = q, with probability µ(e
i
t)
or low qit = q, with probability 1 − µ(eit) (q > q), so that the total output of the unit
at date t, Qt =
∫ 2
0 q
i
tdi, is random. Individual output q
i
t is verifiable and its realization
is independent across time. The probability of a high performance for agent i, µ(eit),
increases with eit. More specifically we assume the following.
A1 µ(e) = min {e, 1} ∀e ≥ 0
While the output qit is ex-post verifiable, the effort level e
i
t is not. The principal is
confronted with a moral hazard problem since exerting an effort is costly to worker i. The
cost to work is captured by a disutility function ψ(eit), where
A2 ψ(e) = A
e2
2
A > 0.
An equivalent formulation is to set µ(e) = min{ e
A
, 1} and ψ(e) = e2
2
. It is a matter of
convention to put A on the probability side or on the disutility side. The two formulations
are equivalent in term of the results. The important point is that the larger A, the more
difficult is it for an agent to achieve a high output. In equilibrium, the probability of
success is inversely related to A.
We now turn to the description of the workers’ preferences. Standard principal/agent
theory assumes that individual preferences in the work place are fully characterized by
a unanimous dislike of work and a liking for money. Yet, even if it implies costly effort,
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work is often perceived by people as a source of achievement. It does not mean that
all workers find their job beaming. The management literature, and human resources
practitioners stress that work, apart from material and security needs, also fulfills social
needs. Satisfaction in work is therefore related to the perception of its social importance
and usefulness, in short, to its social recognition. Hence the satisfaction differs depending
on whether a task is perceived as crucial or, on the contrary, as subordinate. To capture
the idea that the utility attached to work also depends on the social recognition it yields,
we assume that the marginal rate of substitution between effort and income varies with
the social status of the workers. That is, instantaneous preferences of agent i over status
sit ≥ 0, income wit ≥ 0, and effort level eit ≥ 0, are represented by the following utility
function:
Ui(s
i
t, w
i
t, e
i
t) = s
i
tw
i
t − ψ(eit).(2)
The improved work motivation induced by a higher status translates into a greater
willingness to exert effort in exchange for some additional income. This is captured by
the marginal rate of substitution between effort and income which is decreasing in status.
This assumption deserves a comment. In particular why should higher social status be
associated with more responsiveness towards pecuniary rewards? Beyond the consider-
ations on work satisfaction mentioned above an interpretation may be derived from the
relative income hypothesis proposed by Duesenberry (1949).6 A different status implies
a different social role, meaning that a person is expected to adopt a different behavior.
In particular people with high status are expected to adopt consumption patterns which
are more expensive than those of low status people. Thus an employee whose status
is increased is induced to work harder in order to meet her new reference group’s con-
sumption standards. Note that with the utility function (2), status may be used as a
substitute for income, so that it is a priori quite possible that high status people earn
less, as it is the case in Fershtman and Weiss (1993). However this is not an equilibrium
phenomenon. We do not observe it empirically either (in practice status and income are
6Gardes (1999), using polish panel date, tests for relative income effects and concludes that they do
exist. See also Clark and Oswald (1996).
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positively correlated).
It should also be noted that the marginal rate of substitution between effort and status
is decreasing in income implying that a higher income induces a greater willingness to
exert effort in exchange for an improved status. This reflects the fact that the concern
for social recognition is all the more developed that people have an income which affords
them comfortable material conditions. Further justifications and discussions of this utility
function may be found in Auriol-Renault (2000).
2.2 Social Status and Hierarchy
Since social status increases the effectiveness of the monetary rewards, whoever is in
charge of the organization will try to manipulate the hierarchy in order to make work in-
centives as cheap as possible. Acknowledging the influence of social status on individual
motivation to work leads to an obvious question: through what means may organizations
control social recognition of their members? It is often hard to disentangle pure social
recognition considerations from the cheer enjoyment of better work conditions. For in-
stance a pleasant office and expensive furniture are likely to make work more enjoyable,
but they are also perceived as the sign of a person’s high status. The introduction of a
formal hierarchy in which positions are labelled differently and ordered vertically repre-
sents an unambiguous way of allocating social recognition in the workplace. The present
paper looks at hierarchies as a means of allocating status. Hierarchy is used here in a very
broad sense. It is merely a system which establishes a complete order among organization
members. It can be for instance a collection of numbers (ranks) to be assigned to each
member of the organization together with the order relation ”superior to” among them.
The organization designer chooses a hierarchical structure for the social status allo-
cation it yields. By manipulating the hierarchy, she changes the set of attainable status
levels. However she is constrained in this manipulation. For instance if there is a large
number of individuals –a continuum each of whom receives a rank in a closed interval
[r, r], choosing a hierarchy is equivalent to selecting a density f(r) over the set of ranks.
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Then a natural social status index for an individual situated at rank r in the hierarchy
f(.) is sr =
∫ r
r f(r˜)dr˜ = F (r). Indeed this index provides the exact position of individual
r on the social scale (it is a sufficient statistic). It is easy to check that the sum of such a
status index is constant independently of the hierarchy considered (i.e. no matter what
the density f is). That is,
∫ r
r F (r)f(r)dr =
1
2
∀f(.). This status index is used in most of
the papers which aim at studying the impact of the status motive at the macro-economic
level (see for instance Frank (1985), Robson (1992)). A discrete version of this index in
a hierarchy with N individuals attributed ranks ri (i = 1, ..., N) such that ri > rj if and
only if i is the strict superiors of j, is the following: si =
N−1+
∑N
k=1
(1 rk<ri−1 rk>ri)
(N−1) where
11rk < ri = 1 if rk < ri and 0 otherwise. Such a status index provides the position of
individual i on a social scale defined on [0, 2]. For instance if an individual is alone at
the top of the hierarchy (the other N − 1 agents are his inferiors), he gets a social status
index of 2. Symmetrically if an individual is alone at the bottom of the hierarchy he gets
0. If everybody gets the same rank (no hierarchy at all) the social status index is 1 for
everybody. It is easy to check that whatever the particular hierarchy -number of layers,
number of agents per layer– chosen by the principal for her N agents, the sum of social
status index remains constant:
∑N
i=1 si = N .
In these two examples, the social status allocation is a ”zero-sum game” in the or-
ganization (the increase in someone’s status is exactly compensated by the decrease in
someone else’s status). From an economic point of view this corresponds to a constant
return to scale assumption in the social status ”production” function. This is appealing
since social status is a substitute for income; increasing return to scale in status alloca-
tion would tend to introduce a bias in favor of a hierarchy whereas decreasing returns
would introduce a bias against it. More generally, no matter what particular hierarchy
is selected, it should generate a set of attainable social status allocations satisfying the
following.
a) Scarcity: For a given number of people in the organization, everybody strictly
prefers to have more subordinates than less, and less superiors than more.
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b) Anonymity: Since individuals are ex ante identical, the set of attainable social
status in any hierarchy is symmetric among agents.
c) Convexity: The set of attainable social status allocation is convex.
Under assumption a) status in a hierarchy is a scarce resource: the increase of an
individual status is always made at the expanse of someone else’s status. That is, assume
worker i is moved to a higher rank while the other workers’ rank remain unchanged, a)
implies that the status of all the new subordinates of i has decreased, as well as the status
of the workers who now share the rank of i and who previously were his superiors. In
his efforts to allocate status optimally, the principal is faced with the constraint that
more social status for someone necessarily involves less social status for somebody else.
To this we add the intuitive requirement that since individuals are ex ante identical the
set of attainable social status is not affected by who gets which position in the hierarchy
(assumption b). Finally for technical simplicity in the optimization problem we consider a
convex set of status allocations (Assumption c). This is a restrictive assumption but it can
be relaxed somewhat (see Auriol-Renault 2000). Since there are only a finite number of
possible hierarchies when ranking a finite number of people, in practice the set of feasible
status allocations is finite. Maximizing on such a set leads to technical difficulties without
really improving the economic insight. We consider an organization with a large number
of workers (i.e., a continuum). Then even if at the steady state solution there are at most
three ranks in the hierarchy, which obviously is finite, the principal still choose how many
people (which percentage of a cohort of junior workers) will be entitled to a promotion.
Then according to assumption a) the value of being in the first rank is endogenously
determined and varies continuously with the percentage of peers who get the promotion.
Auriol-Renault (2000) show that under assumptions a), b) and c), the set of feasible
social status allocations is characterized as follow (the equality to 2 is a normalization).
(F)
∫ 2
0
sitdi = 2 s
i
t ≥ 0 ∀i, t
Rather than optimizing on the set of underlying hierarchical structures, we optimize
11
on the set of feasible social status allocations defined by (F).
2.3 Contracts
Since social ranking matters for individuals, the principal will rely both on monetary
and social rewards to provide work incentives. For each agent she chooses a social status
allocation sit in (F) (a position in the hierarchy), a fixed wage w
i
t, and a bonus ∆w
i
t in case
of a high performance. Status is allocated before the worker exerts any effort. That is,
when an agent joins the organization he is assigned to a rank somewhere in the hierarchy.
The position is revised at the end of the first period. To be more specific, the timing for
a cohort joining the organization at date t is as follows.
date t: The new cohort of workers is offered contracts that include a beginning status
level, a monetary scheme and a promotion system (future status and monetary scheme in
case they succeed and in case they fail).
date t+0, 5: Workers choose an effort level according to the current monetary incentive
they face, their current status and their promotion perspectives in the organization.
date t+ 1: Outputs are observed, transfers and promotions occur.
date t + 1, 5: Workers choose an effort level according to their current monetary
incentive and status (which may depend on whether they have been successful in the first
period or not).
date t+ 2: Outputs are observed, transfers occur, workers retire.
The outcome qit which depends on effort at date t being random, some agents will
be successful and others not. This randomness allows for ex-ante identical agents living
through different histories. In other words, individuals become differentiated through
their performance over time. Then an agent can be characterized by the current period t
he is living in, and by the fact that he is either a junior worker, denoted by 1, or a senior
with a history of high past performance, denoted h, or a history of low past performance,
denoted l.
12
Each worker’s intertemporal utility is assumed to be additively separable with a dis-
count factor of δ ≤ 1. The expected utility of an old worker whose past performance has
been p ∈ {l, h} and is exerting an effort ept is:
EU ipt = [µ(e
i
pt)∆w
i
pt + w
i
pt]s
i
pt − ψ(eipt). ∀p ∈ {l, h}.
Let ∆U it = EU
i
ht − EU ilt. A young worker’s expected utility if his effort level is ei1t is
EU i1t = s
i
1t[µ(e
i
1t)∆w
i
1t + w
i
1t]− ψ(ei1t) + δ[µ(ei1t)∆U it+1 + EU il(t+1)].
We assume that workers can sell their work force outside the firm. This yields at
any point of time an instantaneous reservation utility of U . The individual rationality
constraints are:
(IR) EU ipt ≥ U and EU i1t ≥ (1 + δ)U
We now turn to a characterization of the optimal hierarchical structure.
3 Optimal Hierarchy
Contrary to monetary bonuses, social status is awarded ex ante; that is, before the worker
exerts an effort. Still it influences his effort because it affects the responsiveness to mon-
etary incentive. Auriol-Renault (2000) show that in a static context there is a cost for
an organization to introduce a hierarchy among identical workers because the benefit on
the high status/income workers will not compensate for the loss on the low status/income
ones. To maximize instantaneous profit, it is optimal to give identical agents identical
contracts (same status, same reward). This result points to the cost of relying on symbolic
differentiation to provide incentives in organizations. This suggests that the analysis in
the dynamic framework should be restricted to symmetric contracts. We postulate the
following.
d) Equity: Individuals who are identical (same seniority, same past performance) are
treated identically (same status, same monetary scheme, same promotion perspectives).
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Assumption d) implies that all young workers have the same contract. Similarly old
workers with identical past performances must have the same contract. We can thus drop
the i index. Individuals are fully characterized by their seniority and past performance
within the firm at date t. Under assumption d) there are at most three ranks in the
optimal hierarchy.
Since the population is represented by a continuum of measure 2, the proportion of
old who have been successful when young, denoted γht, is equal to the probability that
a young worker in the previous period had a high performance h. Symmetrically the
proportion of old who have been unsuccessful when young, denoted γlt, is equal to the
probability that a young worker in the previous period had a low performance l. That
is, under assumption d), γht = µ(e1(t−1)) and γlt = 1 − µ(e1(t−1)) for t > 0. Then the
feasibility constraint on status allocations is:
(F) s1t + γhtsht + γltslt = 2.
Let us denote c1t = (s1t, w1t,∆w1t) the contract of a young worker at date t, and
cpt = (spt, wpt,∆wpt) the contract of an old at date t with performance p ∈ {h, l} at date
t− 1. The principal must pick a sequence of contract combinations < (c1t, cht, clt) > that
maximizes intertemporal profit. She solves:
Max
+∞∑
t=0
δtEΠt =
+∞∑
t=0
δt
{
µ(e1t)(∆q −∆w1t)− w1t + γht
[
µ(eht)(∆q −∆wht)− wht
]
(3)
+γlt
[
µ(elt)(∆q −∆wlt)− wlt
]
+ 2q
}
.
subject to the following constraints.
F (Feasibility): The array of status levels must be feasible: s1t + γhtsht + γltslt = 2.
IR (Individual Rationality): Each agent’s utility must be above some reservation level U :
EU1t ≥ (1 + δ)U and EUpt ≥ U .
LL (Limited Liability): The lowest wage cannot be under a given (legal) threshold w set
to 0 without loss of generality: wtk ≥ 0 (k ∈ {1, h, l}).7
7As long as we allow U to vary, we can set w = 0 without loss of generalities; they play symmetric
roles.
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IC (Incentive Compatibility): Each agent chooses his effort optimally given his status,
the incentive scheme he is offered and his promotion perspectives: e1t = Arg Max EU1t
and ept = Arg Max EUpt p ∈ {h, l}.
We consider first the problem of a senior worker. Let ept(spt, wpt,∆wpt) denote the
optimal effort level of a senior worker with status spt and monetary scheme (wpt,∆wpt).
The agent chooses his effort to solve:
MaxEUpt = (µ(ept)∆wpt + wpt)spt − ψ(ept).(4)
Under assumption A1 and A2, the agent’s problem is strictly concave in effort; it has a
unique solution. Agent pt’s effort, ept(spt, wpt,∆wpt) = e
∗(spt∆wpt), where e∗(.) is defined
by:
e∗(x) = min{ x
A
, 1}(5)
Then from equation (5) ept is increasing in spt∆wpt and is decreasing with A. It is
independent of wpt due to the risk neutrality assumption. We consider next the problem
of a junior worker. Since workers are expected utility maximizers, it is easy to check
that the incentive compatibility constraints for the young may be written as follows e1t =
e∗(s1t∆w1t + δ∆Ut+1). The incentive compatibility constraints are written as follows.
(IC) e1t = e
∗(s1t∆w1t + δ∆Ut+1) and ept = e∗(spt∆wpt) p ∈ {h, l}.
Taking into account the different constraints (F), (IR), (LL) and (IC), the principal
maximizes her profit with respect to status and monetary rewards.
Initial populations γh0 and γl0 are exogenously given. Our aim now is to characterize
a solution to the principal’s dynamic problem. To do this we restrict the analysis to a
steady state of such a solution. In a steady state, γht and γlt are constant over time. It is
also natural to restrict the solution to be such that skt, wkt (k ∈ {1, l, h}) do not change
across periods. In turn, effort levels e1t, eht, elt are constant over time. There is no loss
of generality in dropping the time subscripts. From now on they are thus omitted. The
next proposition is proved in Auriol-Renault (2000).
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Proposition 1 (Auriol-Renault 2000) In a steady state of a profit maximizing solution
we have:
∆w1 = w1 = s1 = 0(6)
sh > sl(7)
wl ≤ wh and ∆wl ≤ ∆wh(8)
where at least one of the inequalities in (8) is strict.
This proposition makes two important points. First, older employees should be treated
differently, depending on their past performance. This is coherent with results in a stan-
dard repeated moral hazard setting. However, the second point made in Proposition 1 is
that the young should receive minimal monetary incentives. They should instead be in-
duced to exert effort through a promotion system. Rewards are thus concentrated late in
the career. Concentrating the rewards on a particular state of nature helps to reduce the
total wage bill because the rewards are mutually reinforcing. We show in Auriol-Renault
(2000) that this result remains valid if agents are risk averse regarding income in spite of
the consumption smoothing motive highlighted by the repeated moral hazard literature.
By differentiating their status and incentive scheme the principal loses on the old (the
optimal contract for old workers is the egalitarian solution). This loss is outweighed by
the benefit made on the young workers. This model thus provides a rationale for the use
of a promotion system as an incentive device. It also explains the observed long term
character of work relationships. Workers have an incentive to stay in the same company
in order to garner the benefits of their efforts early in their career and it is optimal for
employers to commit to delayed rewards.
The use of promotions as an incentive device clearly has important consequences for
the shape of the hierarchy in an organization. Proposition 1 provides little insight in this
respect. In particular, it does not say how many ranks there should be, what fraction of
the agents’ population should be at each rank or how much differentiation there should
be between the various ranks in terms of status and income. The specific functional forms
used here for the technology, µ, and the disutility of effort ψ allow us to answer these
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questions. In particular, we show that, in equilibrium, there may be only two layers in
the hierarchy.
Let δ = 1. Under assumptions A1 and A2, and in virtue of proposition 1, program 3
becomes:
Max
+∞∑
t=0
{
e1
(
∆q + eh
(
∆q −∆wh
)
− wh
)
+ (1− e1)
(
el
(
∆q −∆wl
)
− wl
)
+ 2q
}
.(9)
subject to
F e1sh + (1− e1)sl = 2.
IR EU1 = e1∆U + EUl − A e
2
1
2
≥ 2U and EUp = sp
(
ep∆wp + wp
)
− A e2p
2
≥ U .
LL wp ≥ 0 p ∈ {h, l}.
IC e1 = min{∆UA , 1} and ep = min{∆wpspA , 1} p ∈ {h, l}.
We next show that depending on the value of A
U
different regimes may prevail.
3.1 Promotion by Seniority
When A is small enough it is easy to provide incentives to the workers (in equilibrium the
probability of success is high). This corresponds to the case of an easy task to perform and
to monitor. Then the optimal management policy consists in promoting all the workers
based on their seniority. There are only two ranks in the optimal hierarchy. In equilibrium
all the workers go through them. The incentive hierarchy has an equal number of people
at the top and at the bottom. It is then tubular. The next proposition establishes this
result. It is proven in appendix 1.
Proposition 2 When A
U
≤ 2 in equilibrium e1 = 1. The optimal hierarchy has two ranks,
the ”junior”: s1 = 0 with ∆w1 = w1 = 0, and the ”senior”: sh = 2 and if:
- ∆q ≤ A
2
then ∆wh = ∆q, wh = U +
A
4
− ∆q2
A
> 0, EUh = 2U +
A
2
, and eh =
2∆q
A
.
- ∆q > A
2
then ∆wh =
A
2
, wh = U , EUh = 2U +
A
2
, and eh = 1.
In this context of an easy task to perform, everybody gets a promotion based on
seniority. Then, in the terminology of the management literature the hierarchical structure
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is flat in the sense that there are few ranks. The pay differential between the two ranks
is relatively small: Ewh − Ew1 = U + A2 ≤ 2U , and the social reward associated with
the promotion also (sh − s1 = 2). Since promotion is within reach for all, its social value
is low. On the other hand, if a worker fails it means that he has shirked. This results
into firing. Promotion by seniority can thus be seen as an extreme example of an up or
out policy where everybody is promoted in equilibrium. We should expect this type of
incentive hierarchies for workers in standardized industries, on assembly lines, or clerical
positions for instance. This is indeed the case in Japan, but also in the US, with a set
of seniority rules at the factory floor (e.g. ”last to come first to go”). Now if the task is
difficult to fulfill and the outcome of work is random the optimal hierarchy becomes, in
the words of the management literature, ”tall”.
3.2 Promotion by Merit
When A is large, it is costly to provide work incentives to the agents simply because it
is difficult for them to achieve a high output. The optimal hierarchy then is comprised
of three ranks. One at the top for the high performers, an intermediate one for the low
performers, and one at the bottom for the beginners. The structure of the hierarchy
varies with A
U
. The higher A, the higher is the difficulty of the task, and the lower the
probability of success. Then fewer are promoted at the top, and the more pyramidal the
incentive hierarchy looks. The next result is proven in appendix 2.
Proposition 3 When A
U
≥ 2 in equilibrium e1 < 1. The optimal hierarchy has three
ranks. There is the ”junior” rank: s1 = 0 with ∆w1 = w1 = 0. For the senior there are
two ranks: sl < sh. Under the assumption that
∆q
A
is small enough8 we have:
sl =
2
1 +
(
2U
A
)0.5(((
2A
U
)0.5
+ 1
)0.5
+ 1
)(10)
sh =
2
((
2A
U
)0.5
+ 1
)0.5
1 +
(
2U
A
)0.5(((
2A
U
)0.5
+ 1
)0.5
+ 1
)(11)
8The exact condition is given in appendix 2.
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Associated to these we have ∆wh = ∆wl = ∆q, wh =
((
2A
U
)0.5
+ 1
)0.5
wl, eh =
sh∆q
A
,
el =
sl∆q
A
which implies EUl = U , ∆U = (2AU)
0.5 and e1 =
(
2U
A
)0.5
.
Proposition 3 implies that as A
U
increases, the probability of success and the number
of people being promoted diminish. It is then easy to check by comparing equations (10)
and (11) that the status associated with the promotion rises. This illustrates the fact
that social status being relative in essence, it is not the same to get a promotion when
everybody gets it, or when only an exclusive group of people gets it. Proposition 3 implies
that the more difficult a task is, the larger the difference in rewards between successful
and unsuccessful agents should be. In particular, when A goes to infinity, both sh and wh
go to infinity, sl converges to 2 and we to
U
2
. In this case the probability of success e1, en
or ee goes to zero. This phenomenon is well illustrated by professions where achieving a
high performance is very difficult, such as managers of large publicly owned companies
or artists (e.g. musicians, painters, movie actors). As predicted by the model the pay
structure in these professions is of a ”Winner-Take-All” type. There are very few slots
to be filled at the top but the rewards are high. For instance Rosen (1981) estimates
that there are approximately 200 full-time comedians in the United States. Similarly the
number of full-time soloists on any given instrument is also on the order of a few hundred.
The number of CEOs of large publicly owned companies is in the same range. The lucky
few who manage to reach these top positions receive huge sums of money for what they do.
In the case of CEOs of large companies, this has been widely criticized. The average total
compensation for the 365 CEOs of the largest publicly-held corporations in the United-
States was $1.95 million according to a survey in Business Week covering 1990 earnings.
The critics point out that these payments are largely unrelated to the performance of the
firms on the stock market, and that they create a feeling of unfairness among the workers
that undermines their commitment to the organization.
Propositions 2 and 3 also imply that the pay differential should be larger in hierarchies
for executives or managers than in hierarchies for office staffs or blue collars. This result
seems to be supported by the little evidence that exists on the pay structure in hierarchies.
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In particular differentials between the maximum and minimum paid within a rank is on
average 50% for office and clerical employees and at least 120% for professionals and
managerial staff (Gerhart-Milkovich 1991). Similarly, in professions involving a great
deal of uncertainty and requiring a lot of creativity, initiative, such as the ones in high-
technology industries (computer, aerospace products and biotechnology), the incentive
hierarchy should be taller, with wider pay differentials than in industries where production
is standardized. For instance Rabin (1987) found that the pharmaceuticals industry which
traditionally invests heavily in research and development has greater pay differentials than
the conservative insurance industry. Undoubtedly, more systematic studies are called for
to understand the determinants of pay structure in incentive hierarchies across industries.
Finally Propositions 2 and 3 suggest that the more ”meritiocratic” an incentive system
is, the taller is the hierarchy and the wider the pay differentials. This result seems to be
supported by evidence from international comparisons. Incentive hierarchies are flatter
in Japan than in the US. For instance regarding the hierarchy for management, Ford
has seventeen layers of management between its CEO and its employees on the factory
floor, and GM has as many as twenty-two. By contrast Toyota has seven. Regarding
wage differences: ”The average CEO of a very large Japanese firm (the equivalent of $ 30
billion in sales) earns 17 times what the average Japanese worker does. For comparable
firms in France and Germany, the figure is about 24 times. In the United States, it is
109” (Milgrom-Robert 1992 pages 425-426). Now it is well established that promotions
within large Japanese corporations are mostly based on seniority: ”A new ‘white-collar’
recruit can expect to spend at least a decade with the firm before being considered (along
with the others in the same cohort, who entered the firm together) for a promotion. Then
members of any experienced cohort are evaluated for further promotions only after more
senior people have had their chances. Pay is tied to seniority as well, with individual
merit or performance pay being rare.” (Milgrom-Robert 1992, page 351).
According to our model, these differences in the pay structure should arise because
of differences in the cost of providing incentives. Why should these costs be lower in
Japan than in the US? One possible explanation is that the Japanese practice of life-
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